![]() ![]() Thucydides famously argued that man’s three strongest motives are fear, honor, and self-interest. Yet it also has the potential to affect the United States’ other core interests. The development of a multipolar world led by the United States and China undoubtedly impacts the global economic system, the security and confidence of our allies, and the standing of freedom and human rights on the word stage. Introduction: National Interests and Thucydides’ Trapįormer Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Sandy Winnefeld, former Acting CIA Director Michael Morell, and former National Security Council Advisor Samantha Vinograd argue that the United States’ principal national interests are, in order: Rather than make a Pacific NATO the cornerstone of that competition, this report argues that a more practical and effective approach would be to build on existing constructs like the Quad or the NATO EOP program while revitalizing economic efforts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In addition to military competition, the United States and China are also engaged in critical technological, economic, and cultural competition around the world. If that alliance includes Taiwan, it could result in even more aggressive action.įinally, this report considers whether a Pacific NATO is an appropriate policy tool given the broader scope of U.S.-China relations. The Chinese are likely to respond to any attempts at a multilateral military alliance in its backyard with a whole-of-government effort to stop it. ![]() And for newer partners, like Malaysia and Indonesia, the value proposition is even less clear. Two of the United States’ most important partners in the region, India and Singapore, have a longstanding aversion to exactly this type of alliance system. Intractable internal disputes abound, particularly between South Korea and Japan and four nations-Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam-with competing claims in the South China Sea. China has significant economic leverage over even our closest allies, like Australia and Japan. And fourth, how would Indo-Pacific nations, including China, respond to such an alliance? This would be exceedingly difficult. It also uses the case of Montenegro’s NATO accession to generate a broad set of criteria for future membership. Third, how could such an alliance be structured? This report examines three options: expanding NATO’s mandate beyond Europe, building on its Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) program, and creating a new alliance system. However, the Quad and RIMPAC do bring together many of the key Indo-Pacific powers and serve as an important foundation for U.S.-oriented multilateral regional security. Second, would such an alliance be necessary given the plethora of existing multilateral partnerships in the region? While there is a broad multilateral landscape in the Indo-Pacific, there is currently no agreement that combines both the wide reach and deep obligations of a hypothetical Pacific NATO. ![]() First, is there a historical precedent for a Pacific NATO? This report does find a precedent in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), though it was largely unsuccessful due to its lack of regional adoption, weak mutual defense provisions, and ultimately became tainted by the Vietnam War. This report will address four questions in the Pacific NATO debate. As China escalates its military aggression in the South China Sea and diplomatic efforts across the globe, policy leaders are beginning to debate whether a military alliance like NATO would be an appropriate tool to balance China’s growing ambition and clout in the Indo-Pacific. Neither president’s approach to China has been one of universal partnership or conflict rather, each has chosen to occupy a different position on the collaboration-competition spectrum on a suite of issues ranging from military posture and regional diplomacy to economic policy and technology development. With this newfound power have come opportunities for cooperation, like President Barack Obama’s climate negotiations with Chairman Xi Jinping that paved the way for the Paris Climate Accord, and competition, like President Donald Trump’s trade war and attempts by both sides to blame the other for the coronavirus pandemic. Since Chairman Deng Xiaoping began introducing market reforms in 1978, China’s GDP has grown from $219 billion to $13.6 trillion, lifting nearly 800 million Chinese out of poverty and transforming China into a global peer of the United States. Managing China’s resurgence will be the fundamental challenge for America’s next generation of foreign policy leaders. ![]()
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